Hezbollah’s Threat in Germany: 
AN UPDATED OVERVIEW OF ITS PRESENCE AND 
THE GERMAN RESPONSE

Jasmine Williams (Research Assistant, ICT) 
Spring 2014

ABSTRACT

Former CIA director, George Tenet testified that the capability and presence of Hezbollah is equal, if not more capable than that of al-Qaeda. Tenet made this statement in 2003, over a decade ago, and Hezbollah has only further expanded its operations as it continues to evolve and function as a hybrid organization with political, social, and terrorist components, as well as expanding its network outside of its home base of Lebanon. As many focus on the growing presence of Hezbollah operations in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, Hezbollah’s presence in Europe is quite fascinating, Germany in particular. Within German borders, the group has built a strong presence, as there is known to be over 1000 operatives within its borders to date. It is important to note what factors have caused such localized German mobilization. This paper will provide an updated overview of Hezbollah operations in the Federal Republic of Germany and its government reaction and weaknesses.

* The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)
# Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 3

HEZBOLLAH STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS IN GERMANY ........................................... 4
  Germany Infiltration .................................................................................................................. 4
    Al Quds Day March .............................................................................................................. 5
  Recruiting German Locals .................................................................................................... 8
    Al Manar .............................................................................................................................. 8
    Steven Smyrek ..................................................................................................................... 9
    Khaled Kashkush ................................................................................................................ 10
  Fundraising Hezbollah Style ................................................................................................ 11
    Charitable Fundraising ....................................................................................................... 11
    Criminal Activity ............................................................................................................... 14
  Multifunctional Hezbollah Operations ................................................................................. 18
    The Mykonos Assassinations ............................................................................................. 19
    Intergroup Activity Among Terrorist Entities ..................................................................... 20
    Intergroup Activity including Private Businesses .......................................................... 21

THE GERMAN RESPONSE TO HEZBOLLAH PRESENCE .................................................. 24

CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................................... 29
  Weaknesses in Germany’s Counter-Terrorism Policies ......................................................... 29

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 31
INTRODUCTION

For the past decade, numerous terrorist organizations have expanded their global reach and Hezbollah is no exception. Former CIA director, George Tenet testified that the capability and presence of Hezbollah is equal, if not more capable than that of al-Qaeda.¹ Tenet made this statement in 2003, over a decade ago, and Hezbollah has only further expanded its operations as it continues to evolve and function as a hybrid organization with political, social, and terrorist components, as well as expanding its network outside of its home base of Lebanon. As many focus on the growing presence of Hezbollah operations in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, Hezbollah’s presence in Europe is quite fascinating, Germany in particular. Within German borders, the group has built a strong presence, as there is known to be over 1000 operatives within its borders to date.² It is important to note what factors have caused such localized German mobilization. This paper will provide an updated overview of Hezbollah operations in the Federal Republic of Germany and its government reaction and weaknesses.

While many academics blame Germany’s rather lenient anti-terrorism laws and lax intelligence capabilities, Hezbollah operatives have been known to closely obey German law to avoid unnecessary attention to its operation prior to planned attacks. Matthew Levitt, an expert of Hezbollah and senior researcher for the Washington Policy Institute, notes, “Hezbollah operatives mold into their environment and can be very difficult to

identify.” Other scholars disagree that Germany itself is to blame, as Germany has taken considerable steps toward strengthening its law enforcement to avoid further Hezbollah presence.

**HEZBOLLAH STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS IN GERMANY**

**Germany Infiltration**

Hezbollah began to show a presence in Germany in the 1980’s during the mass exodus resulting from the Lebanese civil war where the group began to reside in Lebanese Shiite communities. From 2012 to 2013, the population of this group within Germany has grown from 950 to over a 1,000. In the 2012 Annual Report from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (or Verfassungsschutzbericht), Germany’s domestic intelligence agency that monitors extremism, referred to “international Islamist terrorism as a serious threat… and among the greatest dangers jeopardizing German’s internal security”. Of these international Islamic terrorist organizations, Hezbollah poses a significant threat to the Federal Republic’s security, and it has strengthened its presence in Germany and continues to increase each year. In 2012, the German domestic intelligence agency also estimated that there were as many as 950 Hezbollah operatives within Germany, 50 more than the year before with 250 active Hezbollah members in Berlin alone. The Federal Criminal Police Office and Office for the Protection of the Constitution of Germany both reported that Hezbollah now has the capability to strike

---

8 Benjamin Weinthal. The Jerusalem Post, "German mosque groups raising funds for Hezbollah."
anywhere within Germany and the necessary logistics to carry out those strikes at its discretion.

Al Quds Day March

Hezbollah’s public presence within Germany continues to grow as its member and supporter attendance in local demonstrations has become more prominent. Every year, an event known as the al-Quds Day march takes place in Berlin and calls for the destruction of Israel. The annual organizer of the Berlin March is speaker Berliner Jürgen Grassmann who also organizes other the anti-Israeli and anti-imperialistic events within Germany as well. The head of Germany’s federal agency for domestic intelligence and the country’s Interior Ministry presented a report on Hezbollah activities and reported that about 1,100 Hezbollah members and supporters attended the Al-Quds day march for 2012. There were 600 members present the previous year illustrating the drastic increase in participation, although not as large as attendance was in the 1990’s when over 3,000 Hezbollah supporters participated. Also, the Imam Ali Mosque in Hamburg Germany is believed to have chartered two buses that transported an estimated 90 Hezbollah supporters to the 2012 demonstration with all costs paid by the IZH. The IZH, or Islamic Centre Hamburg, is a pro-Iranian organization that operates the Shi’ite mosque and uses “brochures, events, prayers, rallies, and other activities” to spread the idea of the Iranian Revolution.

12 Benjamin Weinthal. The Jerusalem Post, "German mosque groups raising funds for Hezbollah."
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
In addition to the annual Al-Quds Day march in Berlin, Hezbollah has made public presences in other circumstances as well. According to the previously mentioned report, over 700 operatives participated in the “annual victory celebration of the liberation” which celebrates the Israeli Defense Force withdrawal from South Lebanon that occurred in 2000. As many remember the controversial release of the anti-Islamic film *Innocence of Muslims*, Hassan Nasrallah publicly denounced the film, which resulted in many Hezbollah members within Germany to publicly protest in demonstrations in 2012.16

Hezbollah’s German operations are quite fascinating especially in light of the European Union’s recent blacklisting of the Hezbollah military arm on July 29, 2013.17 Europe has traditionally been a hub for Hezbollah to gain political support and raise funds but Hezbollah may be shifting approaches in its EU operations. The Lebanese news outlet NOW published a diagram in July 2013 highlighting major Hezbollah hubs across the world; Berlin was among the seven others in Madrid, Brussels, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Warsaw, Sofia, Bratislava, and Nicosia.18 These major Hezbollah hubs taking place in major European cities illustrate a Hezbollah attraction for ideal relocation and recruiting sites.

Although all terrorist organizations operate differently, Hezbollah cells tend to have similar characteristics commonly referred to as modus operandi. According to Levitt, the groups’ modus operandi includes subtle infiltration into a territory, fundraising

16 Ibid.
operations, recruitment of locals, and other multi-functional operations.\textsuperscript{19} Chart 1.1 further describes each operandi in more detail to include:\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{Chart 1.1: Hezbollah Cell Modus Operandi}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hezbollah Cells and Operatives</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modus Operandi Activity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle Infiltration</td>
<td>Tend to enter country with false documents, enter sham marriages, and conduct their activities under multiple identities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>Cells raise funds through charities acting as front organizations as well as criminal activity such as smuggling and fraud. Organization also holds meetings with collection baskets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting Locals</td>
<td>Recruit members from local populations in areas where they have ground networks, mostly students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-functional</td>
<td>Cells perform a variety of logistical, financial, and operational duties to raise funds, recruit new members, conduct surveillance, provide support, procure weapons, and use dual use technologies, and conduct operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Hezbollah’s infiltration into Germany has previously been discussed, its subsequent operations will be examined further.

\textsuperscript{19} Matthew Levitt. \textit{Hezbollah: A Case Study of Global Reach}.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
Recruiting German Locals

Hezbollah’s public presence within Germany continues to increase as its member and supporter attendance in local demonstrations has become more prominent. In light of the recent increase in Hezbollah presence within Germany, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution reported “Islamist organizations have experienced a surge in support in Germany for the past year [2012-2013].” The report also stated that the number of Hezbollah and Milli Gorus members and supporters in Germany rose from 38,080 to 42,550 from 2011 to 2012. German intelligence noted the activity of the organization’s recruitment and assessed that “young German Hezbollah members are strongly connected and active on the Internet, including social media and various web forums.”

Al Manar

Al-Manar, a television station that reaches between 10-15 million viewers daily from Lebanon, is used by Hezbollah to recruit terrorists and reportedly to communicate with sleeper cells around the globe. This media platform is also another form of radicalization used by Hezbollah to convert European Muslims to its ideology. Although Germany banned Al-Manor television on November 11, 2008 under Article 9 of the German Constitution, as it violates ‘international understanding’ and incites violence and hatred, this ban only applies to “Al-Manar advertisements, fundraising for its Beirut studio, and the station’s reception in hotels” but does not affect the reception of Al-

---

22 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
Manor in private German homes. Al-Manar remains available within Germany via the Egyptian and Saudi satellite networks, Nilesat and Arabsat.

As Al-Manar is known for its radicalization tendencies, one instance of young Muslim militants in Berlin explained their hatred for the U.S. and named Hezbollah’s al-Manar TV as one of their main sources of information. Another instance occurred four months after Nasrallah called all Muslims to take a stand against the Danish Jyllands-Posten cartoons featuring the prophet Mohammed that led to two Lebanese students attempt to bomb trains in Germany as a reprisal for the cartoons but the bombs failed to detonate. The Jyllands-Posten cartoons were originally released in Danish and Norwegian newspapers in 2006; they depicted the prophet Mohammed in controversial poses suggesting support for terrorism and sparked protests and boycotts among Muslims in the Middle East.

**Steven Smyrek**

One of the most known cases of Hezbollah radicalization involves a German convert by the name Steven Smyrek who was arrested in Tel Aviv Airport on November 28, 1997 for affiliation and support of a terrorist organization and was sentenced 10 years of imprisonment. Smyrek’s case is quite interesting as he was born in Westphalia in 1971 and was recruited in Germany in 1977 and even trained in Hezbollah training camps in Lebanon. Upon arrival to Tel Aviv Airport, Israeli enforcement found 4,000 USD, street

---

27 Ibid.
28 Phillips, James A. *Hezbollah's Terrorist Threat to the European Union*. 3
29 Ibid.
maps of Israel, and a camera.\textsuperscript{32} Unfortunately, Smyrek did not serve his entire sentence as he was freed during a major Israeli-Hezbollah exchange in 2004 in which Israel freed 435 Arab prisoners in exchange for an Israeli businessman and the bodies of 3 Israeli soldiers who were taken hostage in 2000.\textsuperscript{33} Although the then Israeli former defense minister Moshe Arens claimed that no certain direct threat would result because of the Smyrek swap, Smyrek shared plans of rejoining Hezbollah upon his release during an interview prior to his release.\textsuperscript{34}

\textit{Khaled Kashkush}

College campuses are another recruitment ground used by Hezbollah, as the organization has commonly recruited students. On July 16, 2008, an Israeli Arab student by the name of Khaled Kashkush who attended school in Germany was arrested at Ben Gurion Airport in Israel for his affiliation with Hezbollah.\textsuperscript{35} Kashkush was born in 1979 and resided in the town of Kalanswa, Israel until he began medical school in Goettingen, Germany.\textsuperscript{36} While studying in Germany in 2002, Kashkush was approached by Dr. Hisham Hassan, director of Orphaned Children Project Lebanon, a non-profit with ties to Hezbollah that will be discussed later, and began to regularly meet him until 2005 when Hassan introduced him to a Hezbollah senior handler by the name of Mohammad Hashem.\textsuperscript{37} Hashem met with Kashkush several times in Frankfurt and Erfurt and paid him 13,000 euros to help find possible Israeli Arab recruits, for a geographical outline of his Kashkush’s hometown, and for information Kashkush obtained on a previous internship.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
at an Israeli hospital.³⁸ Kashkush was indicted for contact with a foreign agent and for passing information to Hezbollah.³⁹

**Fundraising Hezbollah Style**

*Charitable Fundraising*

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution examined the extensive fundraising network throughout Europe and found that Hezbollah finances its operations through “Hezbollah-affiliated mosque associations and raises funds within the framework of religious ceremonies as well as membership contributions” within Germany.⁴⁰ There is suspected to be at least 30 mosques in Germany within this network to include, Imam Mahdi Centre in Munter-Hiltrup, the Imam Reza mosque in Berlin, and the Imam Ali Mosque in Hamburg, one of the oldest Shia mosques in Europe.⁴¹ The Imam Ali Mosque is believed by many to be part of Iran’s regime in the Federal Republic and is funded by the IZH institution.⁴²

Under Director Ayatollah Reza Ramezani, the IZH is the parent organization of the Imam Ali Mosque and is actively involved in various organizations to include: the Council of Islamic Communities in Hamburg, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD), and the Islamic-European Union of Shia Scholars and Theologians (IEUS).⁴³ The Council of Islamic Communities is a Muslim association, also referred to as Schura, and served as a participant in the German Muslim treaty that took place on November 13, 2012 with the State of Hamburg which granted Muslims three official religious-related

---

³⁸ Matti Friedman. Associated Press, "Israel's Shin Bet Arrests Man For Hezbollah Ties ."
³⁹ Ibid.
⁴¹ Alexander Ritzmann. *Hezbollah Fundraising Organization in Germany*
⁴² American Foreign Policy Council, *The World Almanac of Islamism 2011*
⁴³ Ibid.
holidays, religious education, and burial rituals. In 2013, this treaty was later expanded to the German states of Bremen, Hesse, and Lower Saxony and officially recognized three umbrella Muslim associations as religious bodies to include the DITIB Turkish-Islamic Union, the Federation of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ), and the Schura.

The previously mentioned ZMD is an umbrella organization of 28 Muslim groups, as well as individual members, and oversees over 300 mosques; the organization was involved in the German Islamic Conference with the federal government toward Muslim integration until it pulled out in 2008. The fact that the Hezbollah affiliated IZH works alongside such a large and influential organization such as the ZMD shows its possible expansive reach.

While the IZH is shown to have great influential reach within Germany with its involvement in political matters and various organizations, the Imam Ali Mosque went under observation for violation of its anti-hate contract with the city of Hamburg in 2012 as it “advanced anti-Semitism and sold anti-Jewish literature.” As a member of the Schura and a main partner of the Hamburg treaty, the Imam Ali Mosque has been

---


accused for violating that anti-hate contract that outlaws discrimination and violence due to religion, national origin, and religious views.\textsuperscript{50}

The domestic intelligence agency also reported on the non-profit organization \textit{Orphans Project Lebanon} (or Waisenkinder-projek) in Gottingen, Lower Saxony Germany as German intelligence began investigating the organization in 2009 after it found financial connections to the Lebanese Al-Shahid Foundation, which was blacklisted in Germany in 2002 for financial ties to Hezbollah.\textsuperscript{51} Orphans Project Lebanon, a German based charity for Lebanese orphans had been donating portions of its contributions back to al-Shahid, also known as the Martyrs Foundation, which finances the families of Hezbollah members who commit suicide bombings against Israelis and supports Hezbollah members.\textsuperscript{52} A 2009 report from the European foundation for Democracy (EFD) revealed Orphans Project Lebanon as a German branch of the Hezbollah sub-organization (al-Shahid) and fundraising network.\textsuperscript{53} Traditionally, charitable fundraising for Hezbollah was legal in Germany, as the EU had not yet designated fundraising that is explicitly for the military branch until 2013.\textsuperscript{54} Although Germany allowed Orphans Project Lebanon to continue its operations, it eliminated its tax subsidy years ago around the same time that the organization was put under surveillance in 2009.\textsuperscript{55} On April 8, 2014, German authorities banned Orphans Project Lebanon and froze its assets after it raided 19 of its properties and discovered evidence, gold coins, and two bank accounts containing about

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55}Ibid.
65,000 euros. As analysts previously assessed that Germany is Hezbollah’s main fundraising center in Europe, authorities found that Project Lebanon, with its 80 members, raised about 3.3 million Euros for the Shahid Foundation from 2007 to 2013.

While the German constitution gives all citizens the right to set up clubs and organizations, it also warns that any group that “threatens constitutional order or actively work to harm understanding among peoples” can be banned. The Bundesverwaltungsgericht, a German Federal Administrative Court, ruled that any association that contributes financial donations over a “long period of time” in support of a group that “introduces violence into peoples’ relations or results in the impairment of peaceful relationships results from a corresponding intent of the association” is unlawful in 2004. In relation to Orphans Project Lebanon, German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizier stated that

“organizations which directly or indirectly work against Israel’s right to exist from German soil cannon rely on the guaranteed right to freely organize… and the military wing of Hezbollah disputes Israel’s right to exist and is now listed on the EU terror list.”

**Criminal Activity**

Aside from Hezbollah charity-based funding techniques, the group has received large gains from its criminal operations as Europol labeled Hezbollah an organized criminal organization. A 2011 Cypriot court ruling also declared “Hezbollah operates under

57 Ibid.
58 Deutsche Welle, "Germany outlaws support group with Hezbollah ties, raids offices nationwide."
59 Quote European Foundation for Democracy, " EFD REPORT: Hezbollah fundraising in Germany tax-deductible."
60 Quote. Ibid.
complete secrecy…with multiple members and proceeds from various activities, including military training of its members and acts as a criminal organization.\textsuperscript{61} Traditionally, the group has enjoyed large sponsorship from the Iranian government, with funding estimates ranging from 100-200 million a year as well as the Syrian government, but in an effort to become more independent the group began to dive into other funding activities notably smuggling, theft, and forgery.\textsuperscript{62} The Syrian civil war and economic sanctions suffered by Iran have also affected funding, and as a result Hezbollah’s criminal activities to include narcotic trafficking, money laundering, and counterfeiting have increased.\textsuperscript{63} Levitt notes that the organization’s narcotics activities have been so advanced that it will soon earn more profits than its alternative funding methods combined.\textsuperscript{64}

Although there have been rather low instances of terrorist indictments in Germany, there have been cases of criminally linked incidences to Hezbollah.\textsuperscript{65} Immediately after 9/11, Germany adopted anti-terror laws that aided law enforcement and authorities to track terrorist-related activity. New measures were created to prevent money laundering which created a new office in the Ministry of Interior to oversee financial disclosures as well as a new unit within the Federal Criminal Police Office to conduct surveillance of suspicious money flows.\textsuperscript{66} Germany was also the first EU country to exercise money laundering guidelines as well as the “recommendations of the Financial Action Task


\textsuperscript{62} Matthew Levitt, "Hezbollah’s Organized Criminal Enterprises in Europe," 28.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{66} CRS Report for Congress RL32710, Congressional Research Service. CRS-6.
Force on Money Laundering (FATF)” which has praised Germany’s anti money laundering regulations.\textsuperscript{67}

In reference to the Hezbollah narcotic-related operations, an overview of the German Narcotic Drug Act (or "Betäubungsmittelgesetz", BtMG) is needed. The BtMG was adopted in 1971 and includes all narcotics and psychotropic substances included in the international Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and 1971.\textsuperscript{68} It states that

"with the exception of pure consumption, German Law prohibits almost any contact with drugs. In accordance with Section 29 of the Narcotics Law, anyone who trades in narcotics commits an offence. In addition, anyone who cultivates, produces, imports, exports, sells, supplies, acquires, or procures narcotics in any other way without actually trading in them, also commits an offence."\textsuperscript{69}

Participation in the illicit trafficking, smuggling, cultivation, and manufacture of narcotics are the most serious offences.\textsuperscript{70}

In May 2008, two Lebanese men were arrested in Frankfurt airport when customs discovered 8.7 million Euros in their belongings, resulting in an investigation where another 500,000 euros were discovered in their apartments.\textsuperscript{71} The euros contained traces of cocaine with connections to “an infamous Dutch drug kingpin who goes by the alias

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} European Monitoring Centre for Drug and Drug Addiction, "Development of German drug Legislation."

Carlos. This investigation also led to the arrest of two other Hezbollah operatives from the same network in Speyer, Germany for cocaine trafficking from Beirut into Europe with ties to Hassan Nasrallah and other senior officials. Although these men all had ties to Hezbollah as two were trained in Hezbollah camps, they were not arrested for terrorist or militant activities but for narcotic violations. A report in Der Spiegel magazine later reported that the investigated uncovered Hezbollah’s use of Frankfurt airport to raise funds by smuggling cocaine from Lebanon into Europe. 

As Hezbollah seemingly used the Frankfurt airport to smuggle drugs into Europe, it is important to note that a Bloomberg report released that cocaine seizures have sharply decreased by 50 percent since 2011 due to a strict night-flight ban at Frankfurt airport. The ban restricts flights between 11pm and 5am and was intended for noise control but has seemingly affected drug smuggling via the airport. Martin Harsche, an aviation economist noted that this fall is most likely “a displacement of transport” as the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime noted an increase in cocaine shipments to Europe (and Germany) from Latin America in the last decade. Despite the fall in Frankfurt airport, the Munich airport has experienced a surge in cocaine trafficking by 50 percent. Moving away from Hezbollah drug and money smuggling by air, the group has also been known to use the sea as well to smuggle drugs and weapons across borders by way of cargo ships and speedboats from Africa to Europe. Although there are no documented incidences of boat drug smuggling within Germany, some cases of German-related boat

---

72 Quote. Ibid. 40.
77 Ibid.
smuggling of weapons will be discussed later within Hezbollah’s multifunctional operations.

Aside from narcotic trafficking, Hezbollah is known to raise funds from counterfeiting countless products, most lucratively currency and pharmaceuticals. Boaz Ganor, Director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, highlighted the Shi’ite organization heightened involvement with counterfeit medicine that he says profits “anywhere between 10 million to hundreds of millions of dollars a year.” These forged medicines are mostly produced in Lebanon and smuggled into other countries by land, sea, and air.

In 2010, dozens of northern German pharmacies went under investigation in the Braunschweig and Hamburg areas for involvement in a scandal for distributing counterfeit medicines. Although the main source for counterfeits in Germany is the Internet, many illegal drugs have been discovered on pharmacy selves as one pharmacist from the Braunschweig region was found to possess 1.68m euros worth of counterfeit medicines to include lifestyle medicines, painkillers, antibiotics, and cancer treatments. As Hamburg has strong associations and presence of Hezbollah members, possible connections between the counterfeit medicine and Hezbollah are not out of the question. Little information has been released on the indictments of this case.

**Multifunctional Hezbollah Operations**

As previously stated that Hezbollah appears to be utilizing Germany as a logistics hub, it carries out a variety of multifunctional operations within the Federal Republic. When one refers to a multifunctional activity, it mostly refers to its military terrorist activity such as

---


weapons procurement, operative salaries, administrative overhead, and logistics, as well as any post-reconstruction and infrastructure development. Hezbollah engages in cross-pollination which is cooperation between operatives or groups of differing organizations for operational, logistical, or financial associations and have become critical to terrorists who operate outside of their home base ‘in their respective diasporas.’

**The Mykonos Assassinations**

Although there have been no reported Hezbollah-affiliated terrorist attacks within Germany post 2000, the assassinations that occurred in the Mykonos Restaurant in Berlin, Germany on September 17, 1992 are the most well known and crucial terrorist operations of Hezbollah within Germany to date. The attack left three Iranian-Kurdish politicians who were in exile and their interpreter dead; the attach was authorized by Iran’s Special Affairs committee under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and carried out by Iran’s Special Operations council who recruited “four Lebanese nationals resident in Germany- Youssef Mohammad El Sayed Amin, Abbas Hossein Rayel, Mohammad Atris, and Ataollah Ayad- who were known through their associations with Hezbollah …to assist in the operation.” The assassinated victims included leading Iranian politicians of Iran’s Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), political opponents of Khamenei’s regime.

While eating dinner, the four victims were gunned down by two operatives including the Hezbollah operative Rhayel. While the German government concluded that the “Iranian

---

83 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
88 "Murder at Mykonos: Anatomy of a Political Assassination."
government was directly involved in the Mykonos assassinations and in March 1996 … issued an unprecedented international arrest warrant for the Iranian Minister of Intelligence, Ali Fallahian, for the murders.”

No other recorded terrorist incidents have occurred in the Republic, but the same can not be said about the group’s alternative operations.

**Intergroup Activity Among Terrorist Entities**

The government of Germany recognized tactical connections between Iran, Hezbollah and al Qaeda in 2011. This connection was most likely discovered when German intelligence identified one of the victims of a U.S. drone attack as Mohammad Ali Hamadeh on June 29, 2010. Hamadeh, a senior Hezbollah operative involved in the 1985 TWA flight highjacking and arrested for possession of explosives, was released from German prison in exchange for the release of German hostage and archaeologist Susanne Osthoff in 2005. The drone that killed Hamadeh was conducted on an al-Qaeda compound in North Waziristan, Pakistan, killing 11 militants. According to the German news agency DPA, Hamadeh relocated there to join the Islamic Jihad, which has ties to al-Qaeda.

German authorities have discovered cooperation between Hezbollah and Hamas, as well. The group’s financial connections with the Germany based Al-Aqsa Foundation, a Hamas front company, is yet another example of intergroup cooperation before German authorities shut it down in 2002. The al-Aqsa International Fund is a Palestinian

---

89 Ibid.
93 NOW, "The Hezbollah-al-Qaeda connection."
94 Ibid.
humanitarian organization that was headquartered in Aachen, Germany prior to its shutdown and has branches across Europe in Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, and the Netherlands but channels portions of its contributions to Palestinian fighters.\textsuperscript{95} “The head of Al Aqsa International Foundation office in the Netherlands indicated that the office raised funds for Hezbollah in coordination with the group’s main office in Germany.”\textsuperscript{96} On December 5, 2004, the German courts upheld the government’s decision and dismantled all Al Aqsa related activities within the country.\textsuperscript{97}

\textbf{Intergroup Activity including Private Businesses}

An October 2012 report by Lebanese newspapers identified that Hezbollah is active in the procurement of military equipment in Germany, including parts for aerial drones by utilizing Iranian front companies.\textsuperscript{98} On October 6, 2012 Israel shot down an unmanned aircraft or drone that penetrated Israeli airspace.\textsuperscript{99} The drone was later claimed by Hezbollah chief Nasrallah which he claimed was made in Iran, and although it did not contain explosives, it was fitted with recon technology which suggests that its purpose was to spy.\textsuperscript{100} It was later found that the drone was equipped with components manufactured in Germany by Siemens AG, a German engineering and electronics company who produced its camera and remote controlled components, and Bockstiegal, a


German shipping company, produced its metal components.\textsuperscript{101} The unmanned vehicle was purchased by a “fictitious Iranian company that was a front for Iran’s IRGC” that later ended up in the hands of Hezbollah\textsuperscript{102}. Both Siemans and Bockstiegal have other questionable ties to Hezbollah, as a German Bockstiegal freighter, the Atlantic Cruiser, was suspected of carrying weapons destined for Syria, a known Hezbollah hotspot in 2012.\textsuperscript{103} Although the company released statements denying such allegations, questions still remain. In addition to the use of drone equipment acquired from German companies, Hezbollah also acquires weapon equipment from German import-export companies.

On November 23, 2009, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) publicly announced the arrest of Dani Nemr Terraf and Ali Fadel Yahfoufi, two dual German-Lebanese citizens, for terrorist-related conspiracies.\textsuperscript{104} \textsuperscript{105} The Department of Justice filed criminal complaints against Dani Tarraf for “conspiracy to acquire anti-aircraft missiles (FIM-92 stingers) and conspiracy to possess machine guns (approximately 10,000 Colt M4 carbines) for Hezbollah use\textsuperscript{106}. Tarraf was also charged with conspiracy to transport stolen goods to include cellphones, laptops, Sony Play Stations, and cars, while both Tarraf and Ali Fadel Yahfoufi was charged with conspiracy to commit passport fraud.\textsuperscript{107} Tarraf leads an interesting story as he relocated to the Philadelphia area and used his

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{102} Quote. Ibid.  \\
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/shipping-company-reveals-some-of-cargo-on-ship-bound-for-syria-a-828070.html.  \\
\textsuperscript{106} Quote. Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
import-export company also known as Belltower Express, which was located inside Slovakia; the FBI named this company “a Hezbollah proliferation front.”

Looking to the Tarraf example, the use of import-export companies as front companies for Hezbollah operations is an established terrorist activity. Although no further connections could be found between Hezbollah and German-based import-export companies, it is interesting to find that many German companies continue to do business with Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), a strong sponsor of Hezbollah. Not only does the country provide financial assistance but it also trains and arms the group as well. Other companies include Wirth, a German tunnel-boring manufacturer, and KTI-Plersch, a German infrastructure company. This continued business with Iran and the IRGC, labeled terrorist organizations, also leads to equipping Hezbollah in many cases such as the previously mentioned drone incident.

As mentioned prior that Hezbollah conducts weapon procurement via cargo ships, the Israeli Defense Forces released a list of smuggling attempts by Hezbollah that provides an interesting observation of Hezbollah sea cargo operations in relation to Germany. On November 3, 2009, the Francop, a Germany owned vessel was intercepted en route from Iran to Syria containing weapons and believed to be headed for Hezbollah in Lebanon with 500 tons of weapons. A second instance occurred on March 15, 2011 when

---


111 Ibid.

another German owned ship, the Victoria, was discovered attempting to smuggle 50 tons of Iranian manufactured weapons. IDF notes that that technique is commonly used by Iran as a way to transport weaponry in large amounts to Hezbollah.\textsuperscript{113} Although these attempts discovered no actual ties to the German government, these instances illustrate yet another way in which Hezbollah uses Germany for its smuggling operations.

**THE GERMAN RESPONSE TO HEZBOLLAH PRESENSE**

Some academics such as Mark Dubowitz and Alexander Ritzmann believe that the German government is quite tolerable of Hezbollah activities within its borders as it downplays the group’s threat to “save German citizens from the wrath of Hezbollah.”\textsuperscript{114} Dubowitz also notes the inherent difficulty that German authorities might encounter when attempting to take on Hezbollah as their followers attentively follow German law to evade suspicion of operations.\textsuperscript{115} Additionally, American officials also criticize Europe’s rather lax restrictions, despite the recent European Union’s blacklisting of Hezbollah’s military arm.\textsuperscript{116} Traditionally, the Federal Republic has gone to great lengths to block efforts within the European Union to designate Hezbollah as a terror entity”.\textsuperscript{117} It later joined in favor of blacklisting Hezbollah’s military wing after the incident of the Burgas bombing that claimed the lives of 5 Israelis and their Bulgarian driver.\textsuperscript{118}


\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.


German intelligence authorities responsible for terrorist preventative measures include the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), and the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD), while the most significant security authority is the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BKA) and the Federal Border Guard (BGS).\footnote{CRS Report for Congress RL32710, Congressional Research Service. CRS-5} The BND (or Bundesnachrichtendienst) is Germany’s foreign intelligence agency while the BfV (or Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) is a German domestic intelligence agency that monitors extremism within the region.\footnote{Spiegel Online: International, "Intelligence Report: Number of Islamists in Germany Grows." Last modified June 10, 2013. Accessed March 3, 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/intelligence-report-number-of-islamists-in-germany-increases-a-904742.html.} MAD (or Militärischer Abschirmdienst) is the military’s counterintelligence service.\footnote{Ian Allen. IntelNews.org, "First interview in 57 years for chief of Germany’s most secretive spy agency." Last modified February 19, 2013. Accessed April 13, 2014. http://intelnews.org/tag/military-counterintelligence-service-germany/.


The police system has conducted “anti-terrorism raids on mosques and Islamic centers in several states… in effort to prevent terrorist attacks”\footnote{Quote. U.S. Department of State, "Germany: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor."} Muslim communities have criticized such raids as infringing on their freedom of religion. These anti-terrorism raids are not the only controversial method used by the country, as some states such as Baden-Wuerttemberg require residents to complete an attitude questionnaire during the naturalization process;
some changes have been made to this survey in response to Jewish and Muslim criticism.\textsuperscript{125}

The Federal Criminal Police Office and Office for the Protection of the Constitution of Germany (or Verfassungsschutzbericht) both reported that Hezbollah now has the capability to strike anywhere within Germany and the necessary logistics to carry out those strikes at its discretion\textsuperscript{126}. Prior to the U.N. blacklisting of Hezbollah’s military wing, the organization was entirely legal within Germany although the domestic intelligence agency maintained surveillance on the group and its affiliates.\textsuperscript{127} The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution “also monitored right- and left-wing extremists, conducted investigations into anti-Semitic crimes, and at times banned extremist groups deemed a threat to public order\textsuperscript{128}.” To date, since 1992, the Federal Ministry has banned over 39 extremist organizations.\textsuperscript{129} Interestingly, the country as not banned any political parties since 1956 when the Constitutional Court banned the Communist Party of Germany so “Germany, mindful of abuses during the Nazi period, has high hurdles for outlawing political parties.\textsuperscript{130}” All of these factors are interesting when one analyses the operational legality of Hezbollah within Germany.

As Islamic radical terrorism has not directly targeted German citizens, its anti-terrorism laws were somewhat inadequate pre-9/11; Germany has currently realized that this may

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Alexander Ritzmann. \textit{Hezbollah Fundraising Organization in Germany}. 9
no longer be the case. Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich noted that Germany is “dealing with a different threat... Germany is no longer a mere haven for terrorists as it was back then (in 2001); now Europe is even the target for attacks.” Currently, Germany has made 23 amendments to its anti-terrorism laws that expanded the BfV, BND, BKA, BGS, and the MAD authorization to obtain information on terror suspects. Although agencies have expanded investigative power, bureaucratic problems of civil liberties have obstructed its full efficiency as German intelligence agencies experience high levels of oversight in comparison to other countries, and privacy rights are extended to non-citizens who reside in Germany as well.

Germany has also deported Hezbollah operatives in support of the German Alien Act. The Alien Act states that

“people who present a danger to the democratic order of Germany, and who are engaged or encourage others to engage in terrorist organizations will be denied entry or residence permits in Germany regardless of whether the individuals are tourists, immigrants, or asylum seekers.”

In January 2005, the German court upheld a decision made by a lower court to deny a Hezbollah representative a visa extension due to affiliation with an “organization that supports international terrorism” despite the group's failure to be included on the EU terrorism list and the representative’s previous twenty year residency in Germany.

---

133 Lichtenberg, Arne. Deutsche Welle, "German'ys anti-terror law, 10 years on."
135 Ibid. CRS-18.
German court cited that Hezbollah used “inhumane brutality against civilians.”\(^{137}\)
Another man was refused visa extension in 2003 although he had resided in Germany for twenty years as well.\(^{138}\) It is interesting to observe that these deportations occurred prior to the E.U. blacklisting of Hezbollah’s military wing.

Shifting from internal German response to one of a more international voice, Germany was very vocal, alongside France, during the regional 2013 designation talks, in regards to the EU blacklisting of Hezbollah’s military arm, and experienced a lot of internal debate over whether to follow the Netherlands and blacklist Hezbollah, in its entirety or to target only its military arm.\(^{139}\) This was a huge shift from Germany’s stance in 2005 when the European Parliament pushed the EU to ban Hezbollah but Germany highly opposed the idea.\(^{140}\) Prior to the decision to support the EU ban of the military wing, there were disagreements among German officials over whether to ban the entire group or a wing. Hans-Peter Friedrich, the federal minister of the Interior considered banning Hezbollah’s military structure while Phillip Missfelder, Angela Merkel’s foreign policy spokesman, supported an entire Hezbollah blacklisting\(^{141}\). The decision among the EU member states over the Hezbollah ban was definitely a process and Germany’s domestic government was not one to wait around as some German officials called for unilateral sanction against the group as talks seemed on-going\(^{142}\). Despite the E.U. blacklisting of its military wing, Hezbollah is not treated like as a terrorist organization by the German

---

\(^{137}\) Ibid.


\(^{142}\) Ibid.
government as its charitable organizations continue to operate within Germany. Not to mention the German foreign intelligence government “well-known to maintain good relations with the organization...as it serves as mediator in Israeli hostage negotiations.”

CONCLUSION

Weaknesses in Germany’s Counter-Terrorism Policies
“Counterterrorism is not about defeating terrorism; it is about constricting the environment in which terrorists operate -- making it harder for them to do what they want to do at every level: conducting operations, procuring and transferring false documents, ferrying fugitives from one place to another; financing, raising, and laundering funds. It is about making it more difficult for terrorists to conduct their operational, logistical, and financial activities.”

Although the government of Germany has enforced various counter-terrorism measures, many terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah have exploited its vulnerabilities. Assessing Hezbollah’s operational environment and financing networks within Germany created a focal point where German authority can provide additional attention to better restrict the German environment to terrorism.

As previously noted, Germany faces enormous bureaucratic hurdles when attempting to increase intelligence agencies’ efforts. “Privacy laws prohibit police from collecting intelligence and investigations can only begin when there is probable cause that a crime has been committed. In turn, intelligence agencies cannot make arrests and any

143 John Rosenthal. PJmedia, "Germany Does Not Ban Hezbollah TV."
144 Quote Matthew Levitt. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "Islamic Extremism in Europe: Beyond al-Qaeda—Hamas and Hezbollah in Europe."
information collected covertly can not be used in court.”\textsuperscript{145} These privacy rights are granted to non-citizens, and suspects who already reside there take advantage of these weaknesses.\textsuperscript{146}

Another evident weakness of the German fight against terrorism deals with the government’s lack of centralization in its anti-terrorism and counterterrorism efforts. Its most critical security and intelligence agencies, the BKA and BfV are divided into one federal and 16 state bureaus that work independently of one another, which increases the risk of information loss.\textsuperscript{147} Although there have been efforts made to create a Coordination Center, “the 16 federal states are blocking proposals for tighter centralization at the federal level, not wanting to cede authority.”\textsuperscript{148}

Aside from an enhancement of German intelligence and law enforcement measurements, more attention should be given to German private business relations with the country of Iran and the IRGC as these business dealings have shown to benefit Hezbollah as a result. The previously mentioned selling of the drone to a ‘seemingly’ Iranian company resulted in a Hezbollah possession. As the current German administration has been internationally criticized by Israel and the U.S. on its failure to decrease trade relations with Iran, it needs to tackle the rift between government and its private firms that continue to export sensitive technology to Iran, especially with technology for nuclear weaponry and drone fighter plans.\textsuperscript{149, 150}

\textsuperscript{145} CRS Report for Congress RL32710, Congressional Research Service. CRS-7.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Levitt, Matthew. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "Islamic Extremism in Europe: Beyond al-Qaeda—Hamas and Hezbollah in Europe." Last modified


Spiegel Online International. "Secret Deal with Iran? Germany Releases 'Mykonos' Assassins - SPIEGEL ONLINE." SPIEGEL ONLINE.


Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, "Central Council of Muslims in Germany eV." Translated into English by ZMD. Accessed April 12, 2014.